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“A SYSTEM APPALLINGLY OUT OF 
BALANCE”: MORGAN V. STATE AND 
THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS AND 
VICTIMS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PROSECUTIONS 
DANIEL E. DOTY* 
ABSTRACT 
In a series of three cases that culminate with Morgan v. State, Alaska’s 
courts established a unique protection for defendants in sexual assault cases. 
This protection, which allows such defendants to attack their victims in court 
with previous reports of sexual assault that did not result in prosecution, is 
not afforded to defendants in other cases and is based on a dubious “general 
principle” that the credibility of sexual assault victims has “special 
relevance.” The protection is problematic in several ways: it is grounded in 
erroneous stereotypes about the victims of sex crimes; it is detrimental to 
victims and the pursuit of truth; it is inconsistent with traditional rules of 
evidence; and it is unnecessary to protect the rights of defendants. For these 
reasons, this protection for defendants in sexual assault cases should be 
abrogated by legislative action as proposed herein. 
INTRODUCTION 
Alaska law currently permits accused rapists and child molesters to 
put the credibility of their victims on trial by presenting evidence that 
the victim, at some point in the past, may have made a false allegation of 
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rape or sexual abuse of a child against another person. The law was 
established in a series of three cases exempting evidence about the 
credibility of rape victims from the general ban on propensity evidence. 
In the first two cases, Covington v. State1 and Johnson v. State,2 the Alaska 
Court of Appeals began to carve out the credibility exception without 
addressing the conflict with the Alaska Rules of Evidence. The third 
case, Morgan v. State,3 incorrectly cited Covington and cases from other 
jurisdictions in support of a non-existent general principle that the 
credibility of sexual assault and sexual abuse victims carries a “special 
relevance” that exempts it from the ordinary restrictions of the rules of 
evidence.4 
The Court of Appeals established with these three cases a right for 
defendants accused of sex crimes that does not extend to other 
defendants. In doing so, it has limited the rights of sex crime victims in a 
manner that is unparalleled in the rights of victims of other crimes. 
Alaska’s Court of Appeals has perpetuated the common myth that false 
reports of sexual assault are a frequent occurrence and that the women 
who make them will do so again and again.5 The unnecessary and 
harmful protection created by the Morgan exception conflicts with the 
true general principles of evidentiary law, and must be changed. 
This Article seeks to explain the evolution of the law in Alaska and 
 
 1.  703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 2.  889 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 3.  54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 4.  Id. at 336. Specifically, the court characterized the Confrontation Clause 
rationale as follows: 
[A] restatement of the principle that, in sexual assault prosecutions, a 
complaining witness’s prior false accusation of sexual assault can 
indeed have a special relevance—a relevance that removes this 
evidence from the normal ban on attacking a witness’s general 
character for honesty through the use of specific instances of 
dishonesty. 
Id. 
 5.  This Article focuses on female victims of sexual violence as a deliberate 
choice reflective of the epidemic of violence against women in Alaska. See 
Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key Results from 
the 2010 Alaska Victimization Survey, COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL 
ASSAULT (2010), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1004.avs_2010/ 
1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf (providing measures of intimate partner 
violence and sexual violence from survey of 871 adult women in Alaska). The 
choice of wording is not intended to diminish or overlook the painful and 
frequent victimization of men and boys. See generally Shanta R. Dube et al., Long-
Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. OF 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 430–38 (2005) (finding approximately 16 percent of 
males were sexually abused by the age of 18). The changes sought in this Article 
are intended to benefit and protect all sexual assault victims, regardless of 
gender. 
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provide a useful recommendation for its amendment. Section I 
addresses the law as it existed prior to Morgan. Section II of this Article 
discusses the Morgan exception from the general ban on propensity 
evidence as it evolved from Covington and Johnson to Morgan. Section III 
contains an application of the exception in its current state to two factual 
examples, which highlights its practical failings. Section IV addresses 
defects in the exception’s factual and legal underpinnings. Section V 
contains a proposal for legislative action to change the law, and Section 
VI concludes. 
I. THE LAW PRIOR TO MORGAN 
A. The General Ban on Using Prior Bad Acts to Prove Character Traits 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a) bars the admission of character 
evidence. Rule 404(a) states that, in general, “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion . . . .”6 There are three exceptions to this rule. First, evidence of 
a relevant character trait of a defendant can be admitted in a criminal 
prosecution.7 Second, evidence of a relevant character trait of a crime 
victim can be admitted if (1) the party seeking to admit it applies for an 
order of the court, (2) the court conducts a hearing outside of the 
presence of the jury to determine if the evidence is relevant and not 
unduly prejudicial or confusing, (3) the court issues an order that clearly 
identifies what evidence may be introduced and the nature of the 
questions that will be permitted, and (4) in a prosecution for sexual 
assault or attempted sexual assault, the victim’s conduct occurred less 
than a year before the date of the offense charged.8 Finally, evidence of a 
witness’s character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.9 
Unless these exceptions for defendants, victims, or witnesses are met, 
evidence of character traits is categorically excluded from the 
proceedings. In other words: character evidence is presumptively 
inadmissible unless the proponent establishes otherwise. 
 
 6.  ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a). 
 7.  Id. 404(a)(1). 
 8.  Id. 404(a)(2). Evidence of a victim’s conduct in a sexual assault 
prosecution may be admitted if more than a year old if the proponent makes a 
persuasive showing that it is necessary. Id. 
 9.  Id. 404(a)(3). 
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B. How to Prove a Character Trait 
There is a difference between a “character trait” and the evidence 
that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a character trait.10 “The 
defendant is a violent person,” or “the witness is dishonest” are 
examples of relevant character traits. In and of themselves, these “traits” 
are not evidence; rather, they must be established by evidence. Rule 
404(a), discussed above, establishes when and where a party may seek 
to prove a character trait, but the rule provides no guidance on how to 
establish or prove the existence of that trait. For such guidance one must 
look outside Rule 404(a) to Rules 404(b), 405, and 607 through 609. 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) establishes a strict bar on the use of 
specific prior instances of conduct for the sole purpose of proving a 
character trait. Specifically, Rule 404(b)(1) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible if 
the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith. It is, however, admissible for other 
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.11 
As with Rule 404(a), there are exceptions to this ban on propensity 
evidence. One of these exceptions is enumerated in the rule itself: 
evidence of specific prior bad acts is admissible to establish facts other 
than the character of a person. Others are enumerated in the subsections 
of Rule 404(b). These subsections allow the prosecutor, with certain 
restrictions and predicate requirements, to present evidence that the 
defendant committed similar acts in the past in prosecutions alleging (1) 
sexual assault or abuse of a minor,12 (2) sexual assault or attempted 
 
 10.  See id. 405 (establishing the methods of proving character). That such a 
rule exists demonstrates that the court considers the existence of character traits 
to be a separate and distinct piece of information or evidence from the opinions, 
actions, and observations that could be used to prove whether or not a person 
possesses such a trait. 
 11.  Id. 404(b)(1). 
 12.  Id. 404(b)(2). The rule states that: 
In a prosecution for a crime involving a physical or sexual assault or 
abuse of a minor, evidence of other acts by the defendant toward the 
same or another child is admissible if admission of the evidence is not 
precluded by another rule of evidence and if the prior offenses (i) are 
similar to the offense charged; and (ii) were committed upon persons 
similar to the prosecuting witness. 
Id. 
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sexual assault,13 and (3) crimes involving domestic violence.14 If 
evidence of specific prior acts does not fall within one of these 
exceptions, Rule 404(b) prevents its admission. 
Another evidence rule, Rule 405, provides further guidance to a 
party seeking to prove a character trait. This rule provides that where 
evidence of a character trait is admissible under the other rules of 
evidence, the trait can be proved with opinion evidence or reputation 
evidence.15 Evidence of specific instances of conduct is only admissible 
on cross-examination,16 or where character or trait of character is an 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.17  
The character of a witness is not an “essential element of a . . . 
defense” in all cases where a defendant could conceivably point to a 
witness or victim’s character in an effort to absolve himself of liability.18 
Instead, the character of a witness is an essential element only in cases in 
which “a litigant must, as a matter of law, prove a person’s character in 
order to prevail.”19 Thus, for example, Rule 405 prohibits the admission 
of specific prior bad acts even for the sole purpose of proving character 
in a murder case to establish that the victim was the first aggressor, as a 
person’s “character for violence” is not an element of the crime of 
murder or of self-defense.20 In such cases, the victim’s character for 
violence is relevant but the defendant may only prove it through 
reputation or opinion evidence.21 Character is only rarely an element, 
such as in defamation cases where the truth of statements about the 
plaintiff’s character is relevant to the statutory requirement that the 
 
 13.  Id. 404(b)(3). The full text of this rule states that: 
In a prosecution for a crime of sexual assault in any degree, evidence of 
other sexual assaults or attempted sexual assaults by the defendant 
against the same or another person is admissible if the defendant relies 
on a defense of consent. In a prosecution for a crime of attempt to 
commit sexual assault in any degree, evidence of other sexual assaults 
or attempted sexual assaults by the defendant against the same or 
another person is admissible. 
Id. This is a broader rule than 404(b)(2). See supra, note 12. 
 14.  Id. 404(b)(4). See generally Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2003) (discussing Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) in depth). 
 15.  Id. 405(a). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 405(b). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. The court was careful to add that specific instances of conduct may 
be admissible in such a case to prove a matter beyond the victim’s propensity for 
violence, like the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that deadly force was 
necessary. Id. at 1241–42, citing Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1983). 
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plaintiff establish the falsity of the defendant’s statements.22 A witness’s 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is no more an element of the 
crime of sexual assault or any defense to such a crime than it would be 
for any other type of crime.23 
Finally, Rule 404(a) points a proponent of character evidence 
directly to Rules 607 through 609. These rules provide that (1) anyone, 
including the party calling a witness, may impeach that witness or 
bolster that witness in response to that impeachment,24 (2) credibility can 
be attacked by opinion evidence about truthful or untruthful character, 
but specific instances of conduct are not admissible except when offered 
on cross-examination of a witness who provided opinion as to another 
witness’s character,25 and (3) evidence of convictions is only admissible 
to prove dishonest conduct if the prior conviction is for a crime of 
dishonesty.26 Of particular relevance to the question of a sexual assault 
victim’s dishonesty is the second of these rules, Rule 608. Rule 608 states 
in full that: 
If a witness testifies concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of a previous witness, the specific instances of 
conduct probative of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the 
previous witness, may be inquired into on cross-examination. 
Evidence of other specific instances of the conduct of a witness 
offered for the purpose of attacking or supporting that 
witness’s credibility is inadmissible unless such evidence is 
explicitly made admissible by these rules, by other rules 
promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court or by enactment of 
the Alaska Legislature.27 
In other words, Rule 608 provides that specific instances of 
dishonesty are only admissible in limited circumstances, as illustrated 
by the following example: Witness A testifies as an eyewitness to a 
crime. Witness B, called by the defense, testifies that Witness A has a 
reputation for dishonesty. The prosecutor can (1) cross-examine Witness 
B with specific instances of Witness A’s truthful behavior, or (2) call 
Witness C to say that Witness A has a reputation for truthfulness. If and 
only if the prosecutor chooses to call Witness C can the defendant’s 
attorney present evidence of specific prior bad acts of Witness A’s 
dishonesty, which he is permitted to do only because the prosecutor 
 
 22.  ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.070 (2014). 
 23.  E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410–11.41.445. 
 24.  ALASKA R. EVID. 607. 
 25.  Id. 608. 
 26.  Id. 609. 
 27.  Id. 608. 
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opened a door otherwise closed by Rule 608. 
Considering these rules together, one might conclude that evidence 
of a sexual assault victim’s previous false report of sexual assault would 
be inadmissible. While the victim’s character for dishonesty is a relevant 
trait under Rule 404(a), it is not an element of the crime of sexual assault 
or any defense to it. Thus, Rules 404(b), 405, and 608 should operate to 
prevent the admission of specific prior acts of dishonesty, including 
evidence of prior false reports of sexual assault, unless and until the 
defendant attacks the victim’s credibility with reputation evidence and 
the prosecutor elects to bolster the victim’s credibility with reputation 
testimony by another witness. Under Alaska law in its present state, 
however, this is not the case. 
II. THE MORGAN EXCEPTION TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
In 2002, the Alaska Court of Appeals held in Morgan v. State28 that 
evidence of a sexual assault victim’s prior false report of sexual assault 
was admissible at trial if the defendant proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that “(1) the complaining witness made another accusation 
of sexual assault, (2) that this accusation was factually untrue, and (3) 
that the complaining witness knew that the accusation was untrue.”29 In 
doing so, the Court explicitly stated that it was categorically 
“remov[ing] this evidence from the normal ban on attacking a witness’s 
general character for honesty through the use of specific instances of 
dishonesty.”30 Understanding this new rule, which is explicitly 
incompatible with the rest of the rules of evidence, requires a discussion 
of its history. 
 
 28.  54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 29.  Id. at 333. 
 30.  Id. at 335. This language, referring to a “normal ban on attacking a 
witness’s general character for honesty,” does not accurately describe the 
evidentiary ban on propensity evidence. As discussed previously, the “general 
ban” created by the rules prohibits parties from establishing evidence of a 
relevant character trait, like honesty or dishonesty, with specific instances of 
dishonesty. There is no ban on attacking a witness’s general character for 
honesty through the use of specific instances of dishonesty. The situation the 
court describes—attacking one witness’s general opinion that another witness is 
honest—is in fact the only time a party can present specific acts of dishonesty. 
ALASKA R. EVID. 608. As the discussion of the full opinion should make clear, this 
error should be understood to mean that the court was removing the evidence 
from the ordinary ban that would in fact be placed on it by the Rules of Evidence.  
See supra, Section I.B. 
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A. Covington v. State 
The court first addressed the question of the admissibility of prior 
false reports of sexual assault or abuse in Covington v. State.31 Covington 
was charged with and convicted of sexually abusing his minor 
daughter.32 During voir dire of the witness, his daughter, D.C.O., 
admitted that she had previously accused her grandfather and another 
man named J.D. of sexual assault.33 Covington argued that he should 
have been permitted to call the grandfather to establish that D.C.O. had 
made a false report, thereby challenging D.C.O.’s credibility. 
Specifically, he argued that exclusion of the grandfather’s testimony 
violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.34 The 
State, however, argued that the testimony would have been irrelevant 
because past reports had no bearing on the truth of whether she had 
been assaulted on this occasion, and that admitting the evidence would 
simply be a “swearing contest” between D.C.O. and her grandfather.35 
The trial excluded the grandfather’s testimony, and Covington 
appealed.36 
The court did not reverse the trial judge.37 In its opinion, however, 
the court did not foreclose the possibility that other defendants with 
better evidence could admit such testimony or even that Covington 
himself could not do so on remand.38 Specifically, the court stated that 
“[a] defendant who wishes to use [evidence of prior false reports of 
sexual assault] at trial must obtain a preliminary ruling from the trial 
court that it is admissible.”39 This determination requires “a showing out 
of the presence of the jury that the witness[‘s] prior allegations of sexual 
assault were false, as, for example, where the charges somehow had 
been disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity.”40 The 
court held that Covington had not made this showing but “assume[d] 
that on remand Covington [would] be given a reasonable opportunity to 
attempt to show the falsity of the prior accusations.”41 In finding this, 
the court did not articulate any legal basis for the holding. It merely 
found that other courts’ rulings in similar cases were persuasive, 
 
 31.  703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 32.  Id. at 438. 
 33.  Id. at 441. 
 34.  Id. at 442. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 441. 
 37.  Id. at 442. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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without discussing the inconsistency of the holding with Evidence Rules 
404, 405, and 607 through 609.42 The court failed to explain whether 
falsity establishes relevance but not admissibility, or whether falsity, 
once established, guarantees that the evidence will be admitted. 
B. Johnson v. State 
The issue remained untouched and unsettled for ten years. In 1995, 
the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Johnson v. State,43 which in 
some ways clarified Covington and in other ways served to further 
muddy the waters. In Johnson, trial testimony established that the victim, 
L.K., left a bar and hitchhiked home.44 Defendants John and Russell 
Johnson stopped to offer her a ride. L.K. reported to police later that 
night that the Johnsons had raped her at gunpoint.45 John testified at 
trial that he had consensual sex with L.K. and that Russell did not have 
any sexual contact with her at all.46 The defendants sought to present 
evidence that L.K. had reported two similar sexual assaults in January 
1979 and that these reports had not been substantiated or prosecuted 
because L.K. had not cooperated after her initial report.47 They argued 
that this indicated the reports could be false and thus admissible under 
Covington.48 The trial court refused to allow the defendants to introduce 
evidence, particularly the testimony of L.K., and of the falsity of the two 
prior assaults.49 The Johnsons were both convicted and they appealed on 
the grounds, inter alia, that the trial court erred in preventing 
questioning on the prior reports.50 In doing so, the Johnsons relied on 
Evidence Rule 404(a)(2), which allows evidence of a relevant character 
trait of a victim of a crime to be admitted after a hearing.51 
The Johnson court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the evidence. 
The court held that the ruling in Covington “suggest[s] that evidence of 
past false reports of sexual assault may under some circumstances be 
admissible to discredit an alleged victim’s current claims of sexual 
assault,” but the court also concluded that “the proponent of such 
 
 42.  See id. (holding that a majority of courts that have considered the issue 
have held that, at a minimum, a defendant must make a threshold showing that 
a report is false before it can be presented). 
 43.  889 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 44.  Id. at 1078. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1079. 
 51.  Id. 
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evidence bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the 
past reports.”52 The court held that “the off chance of discovering 
falsehood did not vest the Johnsons with the right to demand that L.K. 
testify” about the prior reports.53 The court rejected the Johnsons’ 
404(a)(2) argument because such hearings only arise “when necessary” 
and are not to be used as a discovery tool.54 Such hearings are only 
“necessary” where there is a “threshold showing of good cause—that is, 
upon proof of a colorable ground to believe that character evidence 
favorable to the defense actually does exist and will be disclosed by the 
requested examination.”55 The court affirmed the trial court’s 
evidentiary ruling because the Johnsons failed to establish that there was 
a “likelihood, or even [a] possibility, of a recantation.”56 The court never 
addressed the fact that while Rule 404(a)(2) establishes that a relevant 
character trait of a victim can be discussed at trial, Rules 404(b) and 405 
state that specific instances of conduct cannot be used to establish the 
existence of that trait. 
C. Morgan v. State 
After Covington and Johnson, Rule 404 appeared to remain valid in 
cases involving the credibility of sexual assault cases. Neither case 
expressly repudiated the ban articulated in the evidence rules on 
admitting specific instances of conduct to prove character as expressed 
in the Rules of Evidence. Indeed, the Johnson court stated that per 
Covington, such evidence may be, but is not automatically, admissible.57 
An attorney seeking to reconcile the Rules of Evidence with these 
holdings could conclude that reports that are not provably false are, 
without question, irrelevant and thus inadmissible, but that provably 
false reports may be admitted for purposes consistent with Rules 404(b) 
and 607 through 609. 
In 2002, however, the court issued a ruling in Morgan v. State58  that 
unequivocally precluded this reading.59 Morgan was tried for sexual 
assault and asked the trial judge to allow him to introduce the testimony 
of witnesses who were going to say that the victim had made previous 
 
 52.  Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). 
 53.  Id. at 1079. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1078. 
 58.  54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 59.  Id. at 332–33. 
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false accusations of sexual assault against other men.60 The trial court 
denied him the opportunity to do so, and Morgan was convicted.61 
The Court of Appeals characterized the question before it as, 
“[w]hat exactly must a defendant prove when seeking to establish that 
an alleged sexual assault victim has made a prior false accusation of 
rape? And what is the burden of proof on this issue?”62 Summarizing its 
answer, the court mischaracterized its previous opinions, stating: 
[W]e held [in those cases that evidence of prior false reports] is 
admissible if, as a foundational matter, the defendant 
establishes the falsity of the prior accusations. . . . If the trial 
judge concludes that, more likely than not, the complaining 
witness made a knowingly false accusation of sexual assault on 
another occasion, then the defendant will be permitted to 
present this evidence to the jury.63 
Ignored entirely was the Johnson court’s prior statement that 
“evidence of past false reports of sexual assault may under some 
circumstances be admissible to discredit an alleged victim’s current 
claims of sexual assault . . . . ”64 The Morgan court decided that the law 
had been clear for seventeen years, that in all circumstances, the 
evidence is admissible as long as falsity is established, and that the only 
uncertainty for practitioners was how much evidence the defendant 
needed to present to the court under 404(a)(2) before putting the victim 
on trial and shifting attention away from the defendant’s conduct.65 
The Court of Appeals recognized for the first time the conflict 
between this new rule and the Rules of Evidence: 
[Other states’] decisions in this area focus on two potential legal 
impediments to a defendant’s right to introduce evidence of 
prior false accusations. The first impediment is the rule 
embodied in Alaska Evidence Rules 405 and 608: the 
prohibition against attacking a witness’s character for honesty 
by presenting proof of specific instances in which the witness 
has acted dishonestly. The second impediment is the rule that a 
party is not allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach 
a witness’s answers on cross-examination regarding collateral 
matters (such as the witness’s possible acts of dishonesty on 
 
 60.  Id. at 333–34. 
 61.  Id. at 340. 
 62.  Id. at 333. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis 
added). 
 65.  Morgan, 54 P.3d at 336. 
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other occasions).66 
The court dismissed the conflict quickly. It noted that courts in 
Texas, Oregon, and Kansas concluded that despite Rule 608, “the 
confrontation clause of the Constitution requires this kind of 
impeachment if the evidence of the complaining witness’s fabrication is 
strong enough.”67 With this, the court asserted its holding: 
We believe that this confrontation-clause rationale is, at its core, 
simply a restatement of the principle that, in sexual assault 
prosecutions, a complaining witness’s prior accusation of 
sexual assault can indeed have a special relevance—a relevance 
that removes this evidence from the normal ban on attacking a 
witness’s general character for honesty through the use of 
specific instances of dishonesty. . . . [I]f the defendant proves 
that a complaining witness has made prior false accusations of 
sexual assault . . . , the defendant is not limited to cross-
examining the complaining witness concerning these prior 
accusations. Rather, the defendant can both cross-examine the 
complaining witness and present extrinsic evidence on this 
point.68 
This is the current state of the law in Alaska. This Article will 
explore its application to two hypothetical cases before critiquing the 
legal reasoning that supports the court’s holding. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORGAN: EXPLORING 
HYPOTHETICALS 
A. Case Study One: Jane 
Jane is a 30-year-old woman in 2015. In 2010, she went on a date 
with Allen, whom she knew prior. In 2011, she reported to police that 
Allen had sexually assaulted her during the date. When asked why she 
waited to tell someone, she replied that Allen had threatened her. 
Officers interviewed Allen, who admitted that he had sexual intercourse 
with Jane, but stated that it was consensual. There were no eyewitnesses. 
Because of the delay, there was no forensic evidence. The prosecutor 
declined to prosecute the case due to the lack of corroborating evidence. 
In 2015, Jane went on a date with a man named Bob. In the early 
morning hours immediately following the date, Jane arrived at the 
 
 66.  Id. at 335. 
 67.  Id. at 336. 
 68.  Id. 
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police station. Crying, Jane told officers that Bob had sexually assaulted 
her. She was transported to the hospital, where a Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiner collected forensic evidence that proved Bob had engaged in 
sexual intercourse with Jane. When officers attempted to interview Bob, 
he declined to participate, as was his right. There were no other 
witnesses. The prosecutor charged Bob with sexual assault in the first 
degree. The defense attorney learned of Jane’s 2011 report and sought to 
admit it as a prior false report. In requesting a hearing, the attorney 
proffered Allen as a witness to deny that he sexually assaulted Jane. 
A trial court, applying Morgan, would almost certainly have to 
conduct a hearing. All three cases in the Morgan trilogy indicate that a 
defendant has a right, on proffer of some credible evidence that goes 
beyond mere speculation or curiosity, to attempt to meet his burden 
under Morgan—a foundational showing he will probably satisfy by 
proffering Allen’s testimony. Thus, even though Jane was raped in both 
2010 and in 2015, she will now be forced to confront both of her rapists in 
court to defend her integrity against an attack that the rules of evidence 
would clearly not otherwise permit. 
Applying the Morgan test, it is not clear whether Bob will be able to 
meet his burden at the Morgan hearing because no case has defined what 
quantum of evidence is necessary to establish that a false report 
occurred. Bob will likely argue that the report is probably false because 
Allen says he did not do it and the prosecutor declined to prosecute the 
case. The FBI and International Association of Chiefs of Police have 
issued guidelines stating that the following factors do not constitute a 
false report: (1) insufficient evidence, (2) delayed reporting, (3) non-
cooperation, and (4) inconsistencies in the victim’s statement.69  Under 
the guidelines, “[t]he determination that a report of sexual assault is 
false can be made only if the evidence establishes that no crime was 
committed or attempted.”70 Under these guidelines, Bob should not be 
able to meet his burden because it should be virtually impossible for a 
court to find Allen, who has a vested interest in denying that he sexually 
assaulted Jane, credible. The court in Covington, however, stated that in 
precisely these circumstances—where the determination of a false report 
was based on a swearing contest between the D.C.O. and her 
grandfather—the defendant should have a chance to establish that the 
 
 69.  False Reporting, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR. 3 (2012), 
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_Fal
se-Reporting.pdf. 
 70.  Investigating Sexual Assaults, IACP NAT’L LAW ENF’T POL’Y CTR 12–13 
(2005), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/IACP_InvestigatingSAConceptsIssues 
Paper_7-2005.pdf. 
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D.C.O. is not telling the truth.71 This result implies that the Court of 
Appeals believes that under such circumstances the defendant could 
actually meet his burden. Jane faces no protections from what should be 
an unnecessary evidentiary hearing, and Covington leaves open the 
possibility that Bob will prevail. 
B. Case Study Two: Mary 
Like Jane, Mary is a 30-year-old woman in 2015. In 2010, she went 
on a date with a man named Charlie, and in 2011, she reported to 
officers that Charlie raped her on that date. Charlie admitted to sexual 
intercourse with Mary, but said it was consensual. Before the prosecutor 
decided whether to accept the case, Mary called his office and recanted, 
stating she made the report up. She asked the prosecutor to drop the 
case, which the prosecutor did. 
In 2015, Mary went on a date with David. Later that night, she 
showed up at the police station crying, and reported that David had 
sexually assaulted her. The officers attempted to interview David. He 
declined, as was his right, but the officers noticed that David had 
scratches that appeared to be consistent with defensive wounds on his 
arms and face. There were five eyewitnesses who unanimously and 
reliably identified David as the man who forced himself on Mary on the 
night in question as she fought against him. Forensic evidence collected 
by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner confirmed that David had sexual 
intercourse with Mary, and Mary’s fingernail swabs and David’s DNA 
(validly collected pursuant to a search warrant) indicated that Mary was 
the one who scratched David’s arms and face. The prosecutor charged 
David with sexual assault in the first degree. As in Jane’s case, the 
defense attorney sought to admit evidence of Mary’s 2011 report and 
recantation. He proffered David, Mary, and a paralegal from the 
prosecutor’s office as conditional rebuttal witnesses in case Mary denies 
her prior recantation. 
Under Morgan and its predecessors, Mary’s prior report would 
almost certainly be admissible because she recanted. Recantation is the 
only evidence of falsity specifically identified and endorsed in any of the 
cases.72 This disregards, however, that sexual assault victims can, and 
often do, recant for a number of reasons. Oregon’s Sexual Assault Task 
 
 71.  Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 72.  See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) 
(discussing the “likelihood or even the possibility of recantation”); Covington, 
703 P.2d at 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (discussing when a witness had 
“conceded their falsity “). 
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Force, for example, specifically exempts recantation from the definition 
of false reporting because “[r]ecantations are routinely used by victims 
to disengage the criminal justice system response and are therefore 
NOT, by themselves, indicative of false reports.”73 In other words, a 
sexual assault victim may wish for a variety of reasons not to continue 
participating in the criminal justice response, which can be lengthy, 
embarrassing, and difficult. Rules like Alaska’s, which permit an 
invasive and normally impermissible inquiry into what may be a 
traumatic personal history, only add to the difficulties sexual assault 
victims face. 
An additional defect in Morgan is highlighted by Mary’s case. 
Morgan does not require a balancing test or an inquiry by the court into 
whether the victim’s credibility is a question of particular relevance in 
the case. Its unambiguous language requiring that “[i]f the trial judge 
concludes that, more likely than not, the complaining witness made a 
knowingly false accusation of sexual assault on another occasion, then 
the defendant will be permitted to present this evidence to the jury” 
allows the presentation of this evidence in any case where the defendant 
makes the required showing.74 In Mary’s 2015 case, she told officers she 
was sexually assaulted. There was physical evidence confirming that 
David engaged in sexual penetration with Mary. There were multiple 
eyewitnesses who identified David. David himself had scratches on his 
arms and face. Mary’s credibility in this fact pattern is at most a 
collateral issue, but the court will nevertheless likely be required to 
indulge the defendant in his presentation of the 2011 report under the 
holding in Morgan, permitting an invasive inquiry of dubious utility into 
her character in front of the jury. The balancing test required by Rule 403 
probably does not prevent this inquiry, as the cases above would give 
any trial court good reason to conclude that the Court of Appeals has 
already determined that this type of evidence is adequately relevant and 
probative regardless of its prejudicial effect.75 
IV. A FURTHER CRITIQUE OF THE MORGAN HOLDING 
The preceding sections present a discussion of the practical 
 
 73.  False Allegations, Recantations, and Unfounding in the Context of Sexual 
Assault, OR. SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE 1 (2011), http://oregonsatf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Position-Paper-False-Alleg3.pdf. 
 74.  Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 75.  Rule 403 states that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” ALASKA R. EVID. 403. 
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problems highlighted in the application of Morgan, but there are a 
number of other additional deficiencies in the opinion. First, the court in 
Morgan placed undue weight on the reliability of evidence of alleged 
false reports, and erroneously concluded that such evidence was 
substantially more probative than prejudicial or misleading. Second, the 
out-of-state cases the court cited for the general principle that sexual 
assault victims’ credibility is a matter of “special relevance” do not all 
stand for that proposition. One of them, in fact, specifically rejects that 
premise.76 Third, the Confrontation Clause does not require admission 
of this type of evidence. Finally, the holding violates the Alaska 
Constitution’s protections for victims. 
A. Disregarding Evidence on Prior False Reports of Sexual Assault 
The Morgan court implicitly concluded that evidence that a victim 
has allegedly made a prior false report of sexual assault is both relevant 
and substantially more probative than prejudicial.77 Evidence Rule 402 
provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise stated, 
and Rule 403 establishes that relevant evidence should be excluded if it 
may cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.78 The 
court did not explicitly analyze evidence of prior alleged false reports 
against Rules 402 and 403, but by holding that such evidence is 
admissible, the court necessarily concluded that these reports comply 
with those rules. In other words, the court concluded that evidence that 
a victim has falsely reported a rape on a prior occasion tends to show 
that the victim was not raped on the occasion in question. The court also 
concluded that evidence of a prior false allegation has a tendency to 
show that the current allegation is also false, and that this tendency is so 
strong and so reliable that there is only minimal danger that a jury could 
be confused or misled.79 This is simply not the case. 
The first error the court made is in concluding that a victim’s 
recantation of a prior report of sexual assault is relevant as a false 
report.80 A survey of methodologically rigorous research found 
 
 76.  Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (declining to 
create a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for sex offenses). 
 77.  See Morgan, 54 P.3d at 333 (placing only a preponderance of the evidence 
burden upon a defendant to show that it is more likely than not that a previous 
sexual assault allegation was more likely false than not before allowing the 
defendant to present evidence of a previous false allegation in the current case). 
 78.  ALASKA R. EVID. 402. 
 79.  ALASKA R. EVID. 401–403 (if such evidence is admitted, a judge must 
necessarily have determined that its probative value is not “outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice”). 
 80.  Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Covington 
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adequate evidence to determine that a report is false in only around two 
to eight percent of cases.81 By contrast, recantation is extremely common 
among both child and adult sexual assault victims.82 This significant 
difference indicates that recantation is not at all synonymous with false 
reporting. Many signs that defendants will argue are indications of a 
false report—inconsistencies in statements, recanting, delayed reports, 
etc.—are in fact signs that a victim simply does not wish to participate in 
the criminal justice system, and should not be used by courts to establish 
any fact beyond that.83 The Court of Appeals in Covington, Johnson, and 
Morgan erred in giving heavy weight to victim recantations. 
Not only did the Morgan court err in concluding that recantations 
are relevant, it erred in its conclusion that evidence of false reports 
would be helpful to the jury determining criminal liability in a 
subsequent case. The public at large consistently overestimates the 
prevalence of false reporting.84 Thus it is likely that jurors, hearing 
evidence that a victim has recanted on a prior occasion, are likely to 
inaccurately conclude that the victim has made a prior false report 
(which as we have seen is unlikely) and that she must be making a false 
report at the present time as well (which is also unlikely). This ill-
informed “gut feeling” among jurors could sway them toward a 
conclusion that, in all likelihood, is not based in fact. This is an 
unacceptable risk of prejudice that should not have been tolerated by the 
Morgan court. 
B. Inapplicability of the “Special Relevance” Principle 
In support of its holding in Morgan, the Court of Appeals opined 
that there exists a general principle that the credibility of sexual assault 
victims has a “special relevance” in sexual assault cases. The court cited 
 
v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 81.  Kimberly A. Longsway et al., False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to 
Successfully Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault, THE VOICE 2 
(2009), http://ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_3_no_1_2009.pdf. See also Dara 
Lind, What we know about false rape allegations, VOX (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/1/8687479/lie-rape-statistics (discussing the 
rationale behind these reports). 
 82.  See Melissa Hamilton, Judicial Discourses Involving Domestic Violence 
and Expert Testimony 123–29 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The 
University of Texas at Austin) (on file with University of Texas Libraries) (noting 
that the frequency of recanting by domestic violence victims is a common theme 
in expert testimony); L.C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child 
Sexual Abuse Allegations, 46 J. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162–70 
(explaining that over 23 percent of child sexual assault victims recant). 
 83.  Longsway, supra note 81, at 4. 
 84.  Id. at 3. 
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opinions from Oregon, Kansas, and Texas in support of this 
conclusion.85 However, Lopez v. State,86 a Texas opinion cited by the 
court, does not actually stand for this general principle.87 In fact, the 
Texas court specifically rejected the principle in a passage that cites 
Covington v. State as an example of the incoherent reasoning behind the 
principle. This passage, on which this Article could not seek to improve, 
is quoted here at length: 
Other states have held that the Confrontation Clause requires 
creating a special exception for sexual offenses to allow 
admission of prior false accusations of abuse by the 
complainant despite evidentiary bars.88 But the rationale 
behind these opinions is not at all clear. Some recurring themes 
are that sex offenses are somehow unique because (1) they are 
easily charged and difficult to disprove; (2) there are usually no 
witnesses to the offense, so the credibility of the complainant 
and defendant are more critical issues; and (3) the nature of the 
charge is apt to arouse sympathy and create bias. None of these 
rationales persuades us to create an across-the-board exception to the 
Rules of Evidence for sex offenses. 
• First, sex offenses are not any easier to charge or any 
more difficult to disprove than any other case. In fact, 
often it is just the opposite. . . . [I]t is often extremely 
difficult for the victim to come forward. And these 
offenses are no more difficult to disprove than any other 
accusation. . . . 
 
• Credibility of the witnesses is no more important in sex 
offenses than in any other case. Any case can involve a 
swearing match between two witnesses: an assault in 
which the defendant and the victim are alone and the 
defendant threatens the victim with imminent bodily 
injury; a kidnapping in which the defendant restrains 
the victim in an isolated location and the victim 
eventually escapes . . . . [T]he complainant’s and the 
defendant’s credibility are no more critical issues in sex 
offense cases than in any other type of case. 
 
• Any emotions associated with sex offenses are all the 
more reason to prevent admission of prior false accusations by 
the victim. . . . [V]ictims of a sexual offense . . . are 
regarded differently from the “ordinary” victim. No 
other victim of any offense is so likely to be accused of 
 
 85.  Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 86.  18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
 87.  Id. at 225 (declining to create a special exception to the Rules of Evidence 
for sex offenses). 
 88.  Citing, inter alia, Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
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fabricating, fantasizing, or “asking for it.” The increased 
emotional level associated with sexual offenses is all the more 
reason to refuse to allow the jury to be additionally confused 
by collateral acts of misconduct by a witness. Indeed, that is 
the entire purpose behind Rule 608(b). 
Legal commentators have also recognized the peculiarity of the 
sex-offense exception recognized in other states. Professors 
Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot point out that this rule “cannot 
be easily squared with the dictates of Rule 608(b). Typically the 
probative value of such evidence flows from the inference it 
raises as to the complainant’s propensity to make false claims – 
precisely the type of inference proscribed by Rule 608(b).” 
 
We agree. . . . As the Ohio Court has pointed out, “the mere fact 
that an alleged rape victim made prior false allegations does 
not automatically mean that she is fabricating the present 
charge.” Prior false allegations of abuse “do not tend to prove or 
disprove any of the elements of rape.” 
 
So the out-of-state cases recognizing a “sexual offense” 
exception rely on nothing but generalizations, and the 
generalizations are just not true in every case. It makes no sense 
to say that certain factors will always be present in a case 
involving a sexual offense but will never be present in a case 
involving a different type of offense.89 
This excerpt explains clearly and succinctly why the Morgan court 
erred in relying on a general principle that credibility has a “special 
relevance” in these cases. It establishes that the principle is based on 
absolutely no evidence, empirical or even anecdotal.90 It explains that 
the Morgan decision gives defendants the right to present evidence that 
is, as the Texas court noted, marginally valuable and very prejudicial, 
inflammatory, and confusing; prior false allegations are minimally 
relevant to establish behavior in the current case and they can inflame 
the passions of jurors who are already notoriously hesitant to convict.91 
Finally, it demonstrates by its existence that the Morgan court assertion 
that the principle is broadly accepted is erroneous. 
 
 89.  Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 223–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (emphasis 
added) (quoting GOODE, WELLBORN & SHARLOT, TEXAS PRACTICE: GUIDE TO THE 
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 608.1 (1998); State v. Boggs, 588 
N.E.2d 813, 816–17 (Ohio 1992)). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
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C. The Confrontation Clause Does Not Require the Admission of this 
Evidence 
The Court of Appeals created the Morgan exception on the theory 
that in all sexual assault cases victim credibility has a “special relevance” 
and that, because of this special relevance, trial courts must admit 
evidence that tends to show prior false reports of sexual assault. This 
approach, however, is not consistent with case law on the Confrontation 
Clause. In Davis v. Alaska,92 the United States Supreme Court held that 
cross-examination on specific instances of prior conduct was necessary 
in order to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice, but that the 
Confrontation Clause does not confer a right to impeach the general 
credibility of a witness through cross-examination on specific prior bad 
acts in every case.93 Applying this holding in Boggs v. Collins,94 a case 
where the trial court refused to allow a defendant to cross-examine a 
rape victim about an alleged prior false accusation of rape, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant may be permitted to 
do so only “when [evidence of a prior false report] reveals witness bias 
or prejudice, but not when it is aimed solely to diminish a witness’s 
general credibility.”95 In other words, federal courts have concluded that 
the Confrontation Clause does not, in fact, require admission of prior 
false reports of sexual assault in all cases, and have explicitly rejected the 
notion that the Confrontation Clause permits use of such evidence to 
attack general credibility. 
Under these holdings, the Morgan exception is not necessary 
because Rule 404(b) already satisfies the intent of the Confrontation 
Clause. The rule prohibits use of specific prior acts to prove general 
character, including general credibility, but it allows admission of 
specific prior acts for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident.96 This is precisely how the Boggs court 
applied the Confrontation Clause when it determined that “bias or 
prejudice” could justify admission of evidence otherwise prohibited. 
The Morgan court, then, created a redundant protection for defendants 
at a great cost to sexual assault victims based on a flawed interpretation 
of the Confrontation Clause. 
 
 92.  415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
 93.  Id. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 94.   226 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 95.  Id. at 736–37. 
 96.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (delineating purposes for which evidence 
may be submitted). 
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D. The Holding Violates the Alaska Constitution’s Protections for 
Victims 
Finally, the court’s holding in Morgan violates victims’ rights under 
the Alaska Constitution. In Article I, § 24, the Alaska Constitution 
provides that crime victims have “the right to be treated with dignity, 
respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile 
justice process . . . . ”97 A Utah case interpreting a similar provision in 
the Utah Constitution explained the purpose of this constitutional right 
thusly: 
‘Victims who do survive their attack, and are brave enough to 
come forward, turn to their government expecting it to . . . 
protect the innocent . . . . Without the cooperation of victims 
and witnesses in reporting and testifying about crime, it is 
impossible in a free society to hold criminals accountable. 
When victims come forward to perform this vital service, 
however, they find little protection. They discover instead that 
they will be treated as appendages of a system appallingly out 
of balance. They learn that somewhere along the way the 
system has lost track of the simple truth that it is supposed to 
be fair and to protect those who obey the law while punishing 
those who break it. Somewhere along the way, the system 
began to serve lawyers and defendants, treating victims with 
institutionalized disinterest.’ . . . Utah law now recognizes that 
victims have fared poorly in the criminal justice system and 
that they are to be more involved in the process of punishing 
the acts of which they became unwilling participants.98 
This passage is an example of what truly should be a general 
principle, particularly in states like Alaska where protections for victims 
are explicit in the constitution—that the rights, interests, and dignity of 
crime victims should be balanced against, rather than subordinated to, 
those of criminal defendants. Such provisions recognize that 
constitutional protections that exist to prevent unjust imprisonment of 
innocent defendants should not be extended so far that bona fide crime 
victims are unjustly harmed. Ideally, this would require courts to 
balance the interests of victims against the interests of defendants when 
 
 97.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (1959). 
 98.  State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56, 60 (Utah 2002) (quoting President’s Task Force 
on Victims of Crime, Final Report, iv (1982).  See also Paul Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 
1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1994) (quoting President’s Task Force on Victims 
of Crime, Final Report, iv (1982)). 
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extending the protections of the constitution. 
The Morgan court applied no such balancing test and in doing so 
undermined the purpose of Alaska’s constitution.99 As the Texas court 
explained, evidence of prior false reports—even if it is accurate—has the 
potential to be inflammatory and confusing for jurors.100 A single prior 
instance where a victim made an allegedly false report, unlike 
admissible opinion testimony that a crime victim is a dishonest person, 
is minimally probative of the truth or falsity of the charges in a current 
case. Thus, the evidence has minimal legitimate value in helping jurors 
establish the truth. The evidence has substantial illegitimate value, 
however, to a defendant who wishes to prevent a trial by embarrassing 
the victim, threatening to call the victim a liar in court, and shifting the 
focus of the allegations from the defendant’s recent misconduct to the 
victim’s past conduct. Because allowing the admission of prior allegedly 
false reports by sexual assault victims provides the defendant only 
minimally legitimate benefit at significant risk of unjust harm to a 
victim, the court in Morgan created an unconstitutional exception to the 
Alaska Rules of Evidence. 
V. A PETITION FOR CHANGE 
The law must be changed—and quickly. Morgan provides criminal 
defendants with a legally indefensible weapon with which to attack 
their victims, and does not help courts or juries determine the truth. It 
serves no just purpose, and yet has the potential to cause significant 
additional harm to a vulnerable group of people. 
The following proposed legislation, if adopted, would be ideal 
given the concerns outlined in this Article:  
 
The Legislature, having found that the credibility of sexual assault or 
sexual abuse victims is not a matter of special relevance in prosecutions 
for sexual assault, sexual abuse, attempted sexual assault, or attempted 
sexual abuse, hereby passes the following: 
 
(a) In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, 
sexual abuse of a minor in any degree, unlawful exploitation of 
a minor, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes, evidence 
that the complaining witness has made a prior report of sexual 
 
 99.  See Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (asserting 
the proper burden without mentioning a balancing approach). 
 100.  Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). See Longsway, 
supra note 81. 
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assault in any degree, sexual abuse of a minor in any degree, or 
unlawful exploitation of a minor in any degree may not be 
admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the 
jury except as provided in this section. 
 
(b) When the defendant seeks to admit the evidence for any 
purpose, the defendant shall apply for an order of the court not 
later than five days before the trial or at a later time as the court 
may, for good cause shown, permit. 
 
(c) After the application is made, the court shall conduct a hearing 
in camera to determine the admissibility of the evidence. The 
evidence shall only be deemed admissible if the court finds that 
evidence offered by the defendant is relevant, that the 
probative value of the evidence offered is not outweighed by 
the probability that its admission will create undue prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy 
of the complaining witness, that the evidence otherwise 
complies with all laws, regulations, and rules governing the 
admission of evidence, and that the defendant has proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that: 
 
1) the complaining witness has made a prior report of 
sexual assault; 
2) the report was false; and 
3) the complaining witness knew the report was false. 
 
(d) A prior report of sexual assault in any degree, sexual abuse of a 
minor in any degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor in any 
degree, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes is “false” 
for purposes of this section if the evidence presented to the 
court is establishes that the incident reported did not, in fact, 
occur. Recantation, delayed report, non-cooperation with law 
enforcement, and/or lack of evidence corroborating the 
complaining witness’s prior report are not adequate to 
establish that a report is false under this section. 
 
(e) Evidence otherwise admissible under this section shall not be 
admitted if the prior report was made more than five years 
before the date of the present offense. 
 
(f) In this section “complaining witness” means the alleged victim 
of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this 
section. 
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This statutory language, which is based in part on the wording and 
procedures of Alaska’s rape shield law,101 should not be necessary. In 
the absence of the decision in Morgan the rules of evidence operate to 
establish that (1) evidence of a prior false report is not relevant and thus 
not admissible unless it is provably false and (2) even if it is held to be 
relevant, it is not admissible because it is a specific prior bad act unless 
certain conditions provided for in the rules of evidence have been met. 
After Morgan, however, the preamble stating the Legislature’s purpose is 
necessary to limit the court’s ability to overturn the law on the basis of 
the reasoning in that case, and the specific language of the statute is 
needed to eliminate the exception and return the credibility of sexual 
assault and sexual abuse victims to the realm of the rules of evidence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sexual assault and sexual abuse victims in Alaska are afforded little 
protection from court-sanctioned embarrassment, harassment, or 
persecution by their assailants. The law in Morgan perpetuates the 
“system appallingly out of balance,” decried in State v. Blake, and shows 
that Alaska’s “system has lost track of the simple truth that it is 
supposed to be fair and to protect those who obey the law while 
punishing those who break it.”102 This wrong can be easily righted, 
however, and it is my hope that practitioners, legislators, and judicial 
officers will heed the call in this Article and take action to protect the 
rights of victims in Alaska. 
 
 
 101.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045. 
 102.  Blake, 63 P.3d at 60. 
